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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN H. KLAS, 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, -
vs. 
MARK 0. VAN WAGONER and j 
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER, ] 
Defendants/ ; 
Appellees. j 
t CASE NO. 900493-CA 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO, JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitut i wu ; *Jtj'jn iH- ,: - •< « ,. J • j i Utah Code Annotate 1 • M 5 ' i 
amended; and, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
'••".her the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter 
cf ..aw, " Defendants made a unilateral mistake in their 
entering into the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
II. Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as 
a matter of law, that Defendai: its •«#-:-:-- - •.•„-. • escission of 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on the grounds of Defendants' 
unilateral mistake, if such mistake did in fact occur. 
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III. Whether the trial court incorrectly applied the case 
of Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P2d 1 (Utah, 1989) in 
rescinding the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and in dismissing the 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
IV. In the event this Court reverses the ruling of the 
lower court in reference to the issue of unilateral mistake, we 
respectfully request, in the interest of judicial economy, that 
the issue of damages to be awarded be clarified by order of this 
Court to conform with the applicable law. 
V. In the event this Court reverses the ruling of the 
lower court, the Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to his attorneyfs 
fees on appeal. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Appellant/Plaintiff Klas will sometimes be referred to 
as "Klas"; and the Appellees/Defendants will sometimes be referred 
to as "Van Wagoners". 
"TR." refers to the Transcript of Record; "R." refers to 
Record; and, "Ex." refers to Exhibit. 
The Transcript of Record consists of three (3) volumes 
each beginning with the numerical designation Page "1." Therefore, 
the Transcript of Record will of necessity identify the respective 
Volume. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A) Nature of the Case: 
This is an action arising from an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement executed by the parties on or about August 11, 1987, 
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wherein the Defendants agreed to purchase the Plaintiff's home for 
$175,000. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for 
breach of contract following the Defendants1 failure and refusal 
to consummate the purchase. 
B) Course of Proceedings: 
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Amended Judgment 
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Court 
Judge, dated March 13, 1990, and July 3, 1990, respectively, and 
each docketed with the Clerk of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about the same dates, and from all 
rulings and Orders of said Court affecting or pertaining to the 
rights claimed and asserted by this Plaintiff. (R. 139, 220, 261, 
274,296, 309) . r 
C) Disposition in Lower Court: 
The trial of the above entitled matter was held before the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Third District Court Judge, on May 9, 
10, and 12, 1989. The court thereafter rendered its Memorandum 
Decision, together with instructions to Plaintiff's counsel to 
prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. (R. 
139-157). After said documents were submitted, there followed 
objections to the proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment by 
Defendants1 counsel. (R. 169-175) 
After a period of almost one year of objections, motions 
for new trial, and new proposed Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment by both sides, the trial court prepared and entered a 
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Judgment on March 13, 1990, which allowed the Defendants to 
rescind the subject Earnest Money Sales Agreement on the basis of 
"unilateral mistake" by the Defendants. The court held that no 
damages were recoverable by the Plaintiff and dismissed the 
Complaint and the Defendants' Counterclaim. (R. 274-277, 309-312) 
There then followed additional objections to the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment, together with motions to amend same. 
(R. 278-295) On May 31, 1990, the court prepared and entered its 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which basically 
clarified factual issues, but resulted in the same legal 
conclusion as the March 13, 1990, Judgment. (R. 296-308). 
Plaintiff's counsel thereafter prepared and submitted an Amended 
Judgment to the court which conformed to the Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Said Amended Judgment was entered by 
the court on July 3, 1990. (R. 309-312) Notice of Appeal was filed 
by Plaintiff on July 26, 1990. (R. "Ill" - Note page number not in 
sequence) Defendants filed Notice of Appeal on August 2, 1990. (R. 
316) The matter is now before this Court for consideration of the 
issues raised by each appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The real property which is the subject of this action is 
located at 2340 Berkley Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. In a 
divorce action entitled John H. Klas v. Carol Louise Klas, Civil 
No. D86-1705, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, the court 
awarded the subject property to the Plaintiff, John H. Klas, as 
his sole and separate property. The Divorce Decree further 
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provided that if prior to September 1, 1987, Carol Klas could find 
a ready, willing, and able buyer of the property, at a price and 
upon terms acceptable to the Plaintiff, she would receive a 
one-time finder's fee for her services in showing the house and 
finding a buyer. Said finder's fee would be 3% of the gross sales 
price. (Vol. I TR. 6-8) (Ex. "1") 
Carol Klas advertised the property for sale and on 
approximately July 25, 1987, held an "open house", at which time 
the Defendants inspected the property and expressed an interest in 
purchasing same. (Vol. I TR. 18-20) The Defendant, Mark Van 
Wagoner, who is an attorney, prepared and delivered an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, together with a $1,000 earnest 
money deposit, to Carol Klas bearing date of August 7, 1987, which 
offer was in the amount of $175,000. (Vol. II TR. 92-98) (Ex. "3") 
Upon receipt of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Carol 
Klas delivered the same to the Plaintiff, John Klas, sometime 
between the 7th and 11th of August, 1987. (Vol. I TR. 21-22, Vol. 
II TR. 98-99) Upon receipt of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
Klas contacted his attorney, Phil Cowley, and attended a meeting 
in his counsel's office to review the written proposal. (Vol. I 
TR. 21-24, 111) During the course of said meeting, Plaintiff's 
counsel, Phil Cowley, contacted the Defendant Mark Van Wagoner by 
telephone and reviewed the document, at which time the parties 
discussed various modifications of the Agreement which were made 
and to which the said Defendant acquiesced and authorized. (Vol. I 
TR. 195-196, 111-114) Thereafter, Klas executed the modified 
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Earnest Money Sales Agreement and delivered the same to the office 
of the Defendant Mark Van Wagoner on or about August 11, 1987. 
(Vol. II TR. 2-4) Subsequently, the Defendant Mark Van Wagoner and 
his wife, Kathy Van Wagoner, executed said document on or about 
August 11, 1987, at which time said Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
was in the form as reflected by "Ex. 3". (Vol. I TR. 189, 197) (R. 
261-272) (Addendum "A") 
By way of background, it should be noted that in 1986 the 
Plaintiff, John Klas, had obtained an "appraisal" of the subject 
premises for mortgage loan purposes from an individual by the name 
of Devere Kent. (Vol. I TR. 30-59) Also, in anticipation of 
selling the property in 1987, the Plaintiff had solicited verbal 
opinions of market value of the property from personal 
acquaintances who were then engaged in the real estate business, 
which appraisals or opinions ranged from $175,000 to $192,000. 
(Vol. I TR. 10-13) (Vol. II TR. 127-133) 
In the course of discussions which occurred between Carol 
Klas and Van Wagoners prior to August 11, 1987, Carol Klas made 
reference to the fact that she understood some "appraisals" had 
been made on the property; she understood they ranged from 
$175,000 to $192,000; however, at no time on or prior to August 
11, 1987, did she or the Plaintiff, John Klas, represent that any 
written appraisals existed. (Vol. I TR. 25) (R. 264, 299) 
At no time on or prior to August 11, 1987, did the 
Plaintiff personally engage in any discussion with the Defendants, 
and at no time on or prior to said date did said Defendants make 
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any request that the Plaintiff, John Klas, produce an appraisal of 
the property. (Vol. I TR. 25) In early October, 1987f Defendants 
notified the Plaintiff that they did not intend to complete the 
purchase of the property. (Vol. I TR. 36) (Ex. "4") Plaintiff, 
Klas, then gave notice to the Defendants that if the sale was not 
completed within ten (10) days, the property would be placed on 
the market in an effort to mitigate damages and that the Plaintiff 
would look to the Defendants for any damages sustained. (Vol. I 
TR. 38) (Ex. "5") Van Wagoners failed to respond; whereupon, the 
earnest money deposit of $1,000 was returned to Defendants by the 
Plaintiff. (Vol. I TR. 37-38) (Ex. "5") 
The property was thereafter placed on the market for sale 
and was subsequently sold for $160,000 on or about April 13, 1988, 
at its then fair market value. (Vol. I TR. 44-45) 
Plaintiff initiated suit against the Defendants seeking 
damages for breach of contract and the Defendants counterclaimed 
for fraud, mutual mistake, and detrimental reliance. (R. 2-5, 
11-23) 
Trial was conducted on the dates of May 9th, 10th and 
12th, 1989. Thereafter, the court rendered its Memorandum 
Decision dated May 30, 1989, wherein the court found the issues in 
favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants and found that 
the Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the sum of $7,500, 
together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, and that the 
Counterclaim of the Defendants should be dismissed. (R. 139-157) 
(Addendum "B") 
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Subsequent to the Memorandum Decision of May 30, 1989, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were presented 
to the Court and objections thereto were filed by the Defendants, 
together with a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and a Motion for New Trial. In response to said Motions 
and Objections, the Court made and entered its Supplemental 
Memorandum Decision dated November 30, 1989, wherein the court 
found that "there was a unilateral mistake by the Defendants", and 
that by reason thereof, the prior Findings of Fact "remain" except 
as to the mutual mistake of fact and considerations relating to 
that finding. (R. 220-222) (Addendum "C") The parties presented 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and 
thereafter, the court prepared, adopted, signed, and entered its 
own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 13, 1990, (R. 
261-272) (Addendum "D") together with Judgment bearing date March 
13, 1990. (R. 274-276) (Addendum "E") 
The Plaintiff thereafter filed Objections to the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, together with a Motion 
to Amend. (R. 278-280) Subsequent thereto, the court adopted and 
entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 
31, 1990, (R. 296-307) together with Amended Judgment dated and 
filed July 3, 1990. (R. 309-312) (Addendum "F" & "G") 
The essence of the findings and Judgment of the trial 
court was to the effect that the Defendants were mistaken in their 
understanding that the lowest appraisal on the property was 
$175,000 and that their mistake was caused by their 
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misunderstanding of representations made by Carol Klas. The court 
found that the mistake provided a basis for rescission of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and dismissed both the Plaintiff's 
Complaint and the Defendants1 Counterclaim. (R. 220-222) (Addendum 
lfFlt & IIQII) 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on July 26f 1990. (R. Ill 
[out of sequence; follows R. at 314.]) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE STANGL 
CASE AND OTHER APPLICABLE LAW IN RESCINDING THE EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
2. THAT SHOULD THE LOWER COURT1S RULING BE REVERSED, AN 
ORDER SHOULD ISSUE FROM THIS COURT CLARIFYING THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES 
TO BE AWARDED IN CONFORMITY WITH APPLICABLE LAW. 
3. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE "STANGL" CASE 
AND OTHER APPLICABLE LAW IN RESCINDING THE EARNEST 
MONEY SALES AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
The first three issues outlined hereinabove will be 
addressed under the argument on Point I due to the 
interrelationship of the issues involved. 
In its Supplemental Memorandum Decision of November 30/ 
1989, (R. 220-222) the trial court ruled there was a "unilateral 
mistake" by the Defendants based on the facts as presented at 
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trial. That Supplemental Memorandum Decision was issued as a 
result of the arguments put forth by the parties in connection 
with objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. Principally, the Defendants contended that a mistake had 
occurred which excused their performance under the Agreement. 
Specifically, they cited the case of Guardian State Bank v. 
Stangl, 778 P2d 1 (Utah, 1989), in support of their claim that 
they were entitled to rescission of the Agreement on the basis of 
their unilateral mistake. It is apparent that the trial court 
based its Supplemental Memorandum Decision on Stangl and it is the 
Plaintiff's contention that the court misinterpreted that case in 
rendering its decision. 
The facts of the Stangl case and those of the case at hand 
are clearly distinguishable. 
The Court noted in Stangl that relief, based on unilateral 
mistake, is available: 
". . • when one party's mistake of fact is coupled with 
knowledge of the mistake by the other party or a mistake 
is produced by fraud or other inequitable conduct by the 
nonerring party," (Citing Thompson v. Smith, 620 P2d 520, 
523-34 [Utah, 1980], Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P2d 63 [Utah, 
1977].) Id. at 5. 
The Stangl court further noted that relief can be accorded on the 
basis of unilateral mistake under certain circumstances and 
observes that each case must be analyzed on its own merit. 
This Court needs only to analyze the testimony presented 
at trial to realize that the rationale applied to the Stangl case 
has no application. In Stangl, the Court found that Stangl knew 
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that the bank never intended to be liable to Stangl when it 
executed and delivered a promissory note without restrictive 
endorsement and that in effect Stangl was endeavoring to take 
advantage of a pure legal technicality in the face of the known 
mistake which he had produced. 
In Grahn v. Gregoryf 800 P2d 320 (Utah App., 1990), this 
Court set forth the criteria for determining whether rescission 
based on unilateral mistake should be allowed. In that case, the 
Court stated: 
f,The standard for determining whether rescission is the 
proper remedy for a unilateral mistake is as follows: 
"1. The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to 
enforce the contract as actually made would be 
unconscionable. 
M2. The matter as to which the mistake was made must 
relate to a material feature of the contract. 
"3. Generally, the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the 
party making the mistake. 
"4. It must be possible to give relief by way of 
rescission without serious prejudice to the other party 
except the loss of his bargain. In other words, it must 
be possible to put him in status quo." Ij3. at 326-327 
(citing B & A Associates v. L.A. Young Sons Construction 
Co. , 796 P2d 692 [Utah, 1990] [quoting John Call 
Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P2d 1205, 109-10 
(Utah)].) 
In applying the evidence and testimony presented at trial, 
it is clear that the four elements for rescission have not been 
met. 
First, the alleged mistake did not and would not make 
enforcement of the Agreement unconscionable. There were arms 
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length negotiations between the Defendants and Carol Klas. The 
record clearly shows that a negotiated price of $175,000 for the 
home was agreed upon. (Vol. I TR. 195-196) (Ex. "3") The 
Defendants were informed by Carol Klas that if they wanted the 
home, the offer would have to be submitted to the Plaintiff on the 
basis that there were no contingencies or conditions attached 
thereto. (Vol. Ill TR. 161 ) The Defendants agreed to those terms 
and executed the Agreement. (Vol. I TR. 195, 196) (Addendum "A") 
(Ex. "3") 
Second, the alleged mistake pertains to the value of the 
property. As stated previously, the Agreement was made on the 
condition that there were no contingencies, and the record clearly 
sustains the Court's finding that the offer was not contingent 
upon the existence and production of appraisals. (Vol. I TR. 
195-196; Vol. II TR. 161) The issue of whether and what appraisals 
were made did not develop until after the Agreement was executed. 
Furthermore, there was no credible evidence presented at trial to 
support the claim or contention of the Defendants that the alleged 
"appraisals" were in fact contrary to any representations made by 
Carol Klas. (Vol. II TR. 91-91, 96) (Addendum "F") 
The Van Wagoners clearly understood that the offer to 
purchase was not subject to any "special conditions and/or 
contingencies" and gave the following significant testimony in 
that regard: 
Mark Van Wagoner testified: 
"Q: Did he call your attention to the fact that there had 
been an ommission of the word 'one hundred1 in the written 
part of the sales price?" 
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"A: I can't remember that, but he very well could have. 
I would have said fine. I mean, it was intended to be a 
no exceptions offer of $175,000." 
"Q: And that's what you intended?" 
"A: Yes." 
(Vol. I TR. 195-196) 
The Defendant Kathryn Van Wagoner testified: 
Q: And didn't she also tell you that the written offer 
would have to be on the basis of no contingencies?" 
A. There could be no contingencies or exceptions." 
(Vol. II TR. 161) 
Third, Defendant Mark Van Wagoner's conduct did not even 
rise to the level of ordinary diligence; especially in light of 
his occupation as a practicing attorney. At trial, said Defendant 
testified that he was experienced in real estate transactions and 
that he had been involved in many "closings" with real estate 
agents. (Vol. I TR. 108) Testimony was also presented to the 
effect that the Agreement was executed by the Defendants after 
consultations with another attorney, James P. Cowley. (Vol. I TR. 
109-116) As an attorney with knowledge of these facts, Defendant 
Mark Van Wagoner executed the Agreement and advised his wife, 
Kathryn Van Wagoner, accordingly. (Vol. I TR. 196-197) 
Fourth, with the exception of the loss of his bargain, 
Plaintiff has been seriously prejudiced by the trial court's 
ruling. Had the Defendants kept the Agreement and purchased the 
home, Plaintiff would have had to pay a "finder's fee" to Carol 
Klas in the sum equivalent to 3% of the gross sales price (R. 8) 
or, in this instance, $5,250. Following the Defendants' refusal 
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to complete the purchase of the home, it was necessary for the 
Plaintiff to have the property marketed and sold by a professional 
real estate agency. That agency received a commission of 7% 
percent of the ultimate sales price, or $11,200 as sales 
commission. Consequently, the Plaintiff was required to pay an 
additional $5,950 in commissions and fees as a result of the 
Defendants1 failure to perform. (Vol. I TR. 47) 
In order to allow rescission based on unilateral mistake, 
the Defendants need to show that all four of the elements listed 
in the Grahn case have been met. Based upon the foregoing 
arguments, it is clear the Defendants have failed to show the 
elements present to allow rescission. The Plaintiff contends that 
the trial court completely misinterpreted the law in the Stangl 
case and the other cases decided by the Appellate Court of this 
State regarding rescission based on unilateral mistake. As a 
result, we urge this Court to enter a ruling reversing the trial 
court's judgment and order that judgment be entered in the 
Plaintiff's favor for the damages incurred consistent with the 
evidence and testimony. 
POINT II 
THAT SHOULD THE LOWER COURT'S RULING BE REVERSED, AN 
ORDER SHOULD ISSUE FROM THIS COURT CLARIFYING THE ISSUE 
OF DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED IN CONFORMITY WITH APPLICABLE LAW. 
We believe that the Memorandum Decisions and Findings of 
Fact entered by the lower court (Addendum "B", "F" & nGn) relative 
to the breach of the contract and the fact that the Plaintiff, but 
for the unilateral mistake of the Defendants, had sustained 
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damages and loss are well supported by the testimony and evidence 
elicited throughout the proceedings of the trial, and by reason 
thereof, this Court should reverse the Judgment of the lower court 
in reference to the issue of unilateral mistake and find that an 
enforceable and valid contract exists between the parties, and the 
true measure of damages to be awarded to the Plaintiff should be 
the "Loss-of-Bargain", i.e., the net difference between the 
contract price and the subsequent price derived from the 
subsequent sale of the property. 
We recognize that the final Amended Judgment entered by 
the lower court did not address the issue of damages as outlined 
in that court's prior Memorandum Decision of May 30, 1989, (R, 
139-157) because of the unilateral mistake ruling. However, in 
the interest of judicial economy and to avoid retrial, we 
respectfully request that should this Court determine that the 
lower court's ruling and Judgment on the issue of unilateral 
mistake, be reversed, then, and in such event, this Court lend its 
assistance in directing the appropriate measure of damages to be 
applied in any further judgment. 
In reference to the issue of damages which should be 
awarded, we submit that the evidence and testimony supports the 
Plaintiff's claim for damage for "loss-of-the-bargain". 
No where in the Record do we find any support for the 
lower court's ruling that Plaintiff's damages should be limited to 
the amount of "$7,500", as reflected in the court's memorandum 
decision of May 30, 1989. (R. 139) (Addendum "B") We, therefore, 
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urge this court to lend its assistance in clarifying the 
appropriate rule of law to be applied in assessing the damages. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of assessing 
damages for breach of contract for the sale of real estate in the 
case of Smith v. Warry 564 P2d 771 (Utah, 1977), and set forth the 
following rule: 
"The rule followed by Utah is that benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages are to be awarded for breach of contract for the 
sale of real estate regardless of the good faith of the 
party in breach." 
In the case of Nielson v. Drobura_Y, 652 P2d 1293 (Utah, 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the application of the 
"loss of bargain" rule as being the measure of damages. 
See also, Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P2d 250 (Utah, 
1978); Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P2d 528 (Utah, 1981); Terry v. 
Panek, 631 P2d 896 (Utah, 1981). 
We do not believe that any credible testimony was at 
variance with the damages testified to by the Plaintiff, nor did 
Defendants present any reliable testimony or evidence to refute 
same. We, therefore, submit the true measure of damages to be 
applied should be the "loss-of-the bargain," measured by the net 
difference between the contract price as originally contracted for 
between Plaintiff and Defendants and the amount received by 
Plaintiff in the resale of the property. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
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The Earnest Money Sales Agreement at issue provided for 
attorney's fees in the event of default. In the lower court 
proceedings a Stipulation was entered allowing the court to enter 
judgment against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff in 
the sum of $6,250 in the event the trial court found the issues in 
favor of the Plaintiff. (Addendum "H") Should this Court reverse 
the lower court as requested by Plaintiff, we respectfully request 
the Court to remand this case for a further hearing before the 
trial court as to the amount of reasonable additional attorney's 
fees which should be awarded for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the Memorandum Decisions and Findings of Pact 
rendered by the trial court leaves no doubt but that the trial 
judge, as the fact finder in this case, was conclusively persuaded 
that but for the misunderstanding or "unilateral mistake" on the 
part of the Defendants only, a valid, subsisting, and binding 
contract had been entered into by the parties. 
The trial court had no difficulty in reaching the 
conclusions aforesaid and making findings in accordance with the 
overwhelming credible evidence and testimony, and it was not until 
the Stangl case was raised as an issue late in the proceedings 
that the trial court modified its prior rulings. 
We respectfully submit that in the Stangl case an entirely 
different factual background existed, in that Stangl never 
intended to be relieved of his contractual obligation and 
attempted to avoid liability on a pure technical construction of a 
promissory note. 
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If this Court were to subscribe to the lower court's 
ruling in the instant case, we submit that it would be virtually 
impossible to enforce any contract if either party chose to come 
forward and allege that they had "misunderstood" some aspect of 
the transaction which they alone deemed to be of great 
significance. The consequence of such a ruling or holding would 
create utter chaos in the field of contract law and present an 
issue for appellate review in every contract transaction. 
The elements set forth by our appellate courts in the 
Stangl and Grahn cases have been meticulously and carefully 
delineate to address those instances where unilateral mistake 
affords redress in contract law. When one applies the fact of the 
subject case in contrast to the factual background of Stangl and 
Grahn, it becomes abundantly clear that the subject action does 
not fall within the ambit of either case. Had Van Wagoners wanted 
to avoid any problem, they could have adequately protected 
themselves by requiring that the contract set forth the conditions 
necessary to achieve that goal. However, the uncontroverted 
evidence and testimony of the Defendants themselves was that they 
knew and understood that if they wanted to purchase and acquire 
the subject property, there could be no contingencies or 
exceptions attached thereto. 
Based upon the foregoing, we respectfully submit that the 
alleged "unilateral mistake" does not constitute a basis for a 
rescission of the contract in question, and this Court should 
reverse the Judgment of the lower court in that regard and render 
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its assistance in directing the manner in which judgment should be 
entered on the issue of damages. 
We further request that should this Court reverse the 
lower court on the issue of "unilateral mistake", then, and in 
that event, we ask that this case be remanded for further hearing 
before the trial court as to the amount of reasonable attorney's 
fees which should be awarded for this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of February, 1991. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to Lewis T. Stevens, 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees, 215 South State, Suite 500, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / ' day of February, 1991. 
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ADDENDCJM TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(A) Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
(B) Memorandum Decision, May 30f 1989 
(C) Supplemental Memorandum Decision, November 4, 1989 
(D) Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, March 13, 1990 
(E) Judgment, March 13, 1990 
(F) Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, May 31, 
1990 
(G) Amended Judgment, July 3, 1990 
(H) Stipulation for Attorneys Fees 
The undersigned Buyer. 
EAKNEST MONEY SAi^aa / lbni^iuv^n * 
Legend Yes (X) No (0) 
\ 
This is a legally binding contract. Read both front and back carefully before signing. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE: AOCr 7/ f f FZ • 
. _ _ - hereby deposits with Agent, 
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount of — 
Dollars ($ ), in the form of 
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law. 
& c u-grtK. pi2 4.uJM ^JL/ /JS3C s>VCi//l?/r1 
/Broker Company 
^KrXT.. 
Received by: J VH-M H kTt+4 
Agent/Broker Company 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
L JPROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is aiven to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated 
at X ^ ^ t2>£lZK€L~Gl 5 T ~ ~ ~ In the City of S 4iJT i^jfrAfr g/HCounty of >4l y — L ~ J $ J & 5 ± Utah, 
subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way^government patents or state deeds of record 
apu/oved by Buyer in accordance with Section 4. Said property is more particularly described as:-7..fry—•3**srtk—?° ..TzCBLTi—** / * ° r /%3 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES: 
^ IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 0 Commercial # n Residential C Other 
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot D Vacant Acreage O Other 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the 
property: plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and 
bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed 
television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmitter(s), fencing, trees and shrubs. The 
following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: 
(b) Excluded Items. The following items ore specifically excluded from this sale: 
(c) Connections: Seller represents that the above property is connected to: 
^public sewer; Q septic tank; {^municipal water; Dwell; JBl^ natural gas; Q irrigation water/secondary system; D other sanitary system 
(specify) 
(d) Utilities, Improvements, and Other Rights. The property presently has or is served by the following: 
^public water main; D well; D water stub in; Skewer main; O private water main; Ji^ gas main; ^electric distribution line;Xogas 
distribution lineTJ^ telephone; D ingress and egress by private easement; Ddedicatedroad; D crops; ^Q^idewalk; CSfcurb & gutter; Dwater 
rights, specify ; O mineral rights, specify ; O other, specify 
(e) Survey. A certified survey O shall be furnished at the expense of , 
prior to closing, fit shall not be furnished. 
(f) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section (d) above accepts it in its present physical 
condi.ion.excep,: ^ F<SJ&^Tlf^S 
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price'for the p'ropertyis 1 ^ ^ f e * W Ffr/tr ~f~jlot/SA«>0 
,Q&,LUAJLSL Dollars \$ f t £ Q&Q ) which shall be paid as follows: 
$ .. ff ft P fl— which represents the aforeuescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
S / 7 Ti ft 0 P representing the approximate balance oi CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
$ representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be 
.% per annum with monthly payments of $„ assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at 
which includes: Q principal; D interest; O taxes; D insurance 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other 
encumbrance to be assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of 
$ which includes: O principal; D interest; O taxes; D insurance. 
representing balance, if any, including refinancing, to be paid as follows: » . 
c 
)?*;. *s TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
Tarrcmg-ryi equiredrBtryer agrees to uac bctH-^ Kofto to proou*4^affvo^R4-this offer is mad^ubjecUa Buy 
institution grant[n^~s^7G*~lT?w r^-au^ex£H£^s t 0 r n a K e application for said loan within 
of this Agreement, at an interest ratenoT"^ J rt/ " 
commitment is not obtained within a reasonable time, this 
If FHA, VA or special conventional financing is contemplated, Seller agrees to pay the lesser a 
days after Seller's acceptance 
.%. Buyer further agrees to obtain a written commitment for said loan, and if the 
oidable at the option of Seller. 
£ount points or $. 
i*Ci I CpiUbUl.lb Midi OdilUI UJ uu 
p.'operty under a real estate contract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be rna&© as set forth in Paragraph N. Seller afrees to furnish good 
and marketable title to thcuuoperty, subji * encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evid«* ed byX.a current policy of title insurance in the 
amount of purchase pnc^LMm abstract o W i e brought current, with an attorney's opinion (Set agraph I). 
4. IN SPECTION OF TITLE. With'o /O days after acceptance of this offer, Seller shall provide Buyeir_with either a commitment for title 
insurance or an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion. Buyer shall have a period of £—— days after receipt thereof to 
examine L\d accept. If Buyer iioos not accept. Buyer shall mail written notice thereof, by certified mail, return receipt requested, within the prescribed 
time period. Thereafter. Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not 
curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith 
shall be returned to the respective parties. 
5. VESTING OF TITLE* Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: ~JU$ (N ^ *V ^ & * j T g P £ ^ P ^ ) / t r / l ^ . 
6. SELLER WAR R ANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the 
property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or 
other encumbrances of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating 
systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. Exceptions to the above shall be limited to the 
following: _ tLl . O lY^rr er 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or 
contingencies which must be satisfied prior to closing: -At n KJ ' 2 ^ 
8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before A ^ f • t——. 1 9 fl^/at a reasonable location to be designated 
by Seller, subject to Paragraph K on the reverse side hereof. Upon demand, Buyer and Seller shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents 
necessary io complete theipurchase in accordance with this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Paragraph L on reverse side, shall be made as 
of Q date of possession Ijfludate of closing Q other 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on C . ( . ,Q^ / ft! k~T- unless extended by mutual agreement of parties. 
10. GENERAL PROVISIONS. Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provisions on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
Agreement by reference. 
11. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and 
conditions Seller shall have until (AM/PM) , 19 , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and 
the Agent shall return the EARNEST MONEY to the Buyer. 
DATE 
"mm& 
pm^ \r\2^iJ\m^^>-B=^ 
CHECK ONE 
i£ 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE 
Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
COUNTER OFFER 
D Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications or specified in the attached Addendum and presents said 
COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. 
DATE ^^tls 'I I ' ' ' SIGNAT/tffi 
T.MP < y ' ' < W / £ £ * , 
-PM) 
REJECTION \ 
O Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. (Seller's Initials) 
AGREEMENT TO PAY REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
CHECK ONE 
D This property is listed by . . Listing Agent/Broker Company, 
and a real estate commission shall be paid in accordance with the Sales Agency Agreement. The Selling Agent/Broker Company is 
D , Listing and Selling Agent/Broker Company 
has been authorized to offer this property for sale and Seller agrees to pay a real estate commission of as consideration 
tor its efforts in procuring Buyer. Said commission shall be payable at closing or upon Seller's default on this Agreement, whichever occurs first. The 
amount or due date thereof cannot be changed without the prior consent of the Listing and Selling Agent/Broker Company. 
DATE SIGNATURE OF SELLER 
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission. 
FORM 123 — Long Gem Printing Co. Salt Lake City, Utah 
MAY 3 0 1989 
c v i. .C;XA ..A 
\ * ' "\pej>uiy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN H. KLAS, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CIVIL NO. C-88-3192 
vs. : 
MARK 0. VAN WAGONER and : 
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER, 
Defendants. 
<Q 
5 
^ 
D 
This matter came on regularly for trial to the bench on May 
9 and 10, 1989, and by agreement final arguments were made on May 
12, 1989. Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel 
Brant H. Wall, and defendant was present and represented by his 
attorneys Lewis D. Stevens and Craig W. Anderson. Witnesses were 
sworn and testified, evidence introduced, and after final 
argument, submitted to the bench for decision. The Court took 
the matter under advisement, and now having been fully advised, 
renders its findings and decision. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. This action involves certain described real property 
located at 2 34 0 Berkley Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. John H. 
Klas was the owner of the property at all times relevant to the 
claims alleged in his Complaint. 
9 
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B. Sometime in late July or early August, 1987, the 
property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a Decree 
of Divorce Klas' former wife Carol undertook the responsibility 
of marketing the property for Klas. The property was not listed 
with a real estate broker, and Klas did not set a specific asking 
price for the property. 
C. In late July or early August, 1987, the Van Wagoners 
looked at the property and expressed an interest in the premises. 
D. The defendant Mark Van Wagoner who is an attorney 
prepared and delivered an earnest money sales agreement to Carol 
Klas, dated August 7, 1987, and also bearing the date of August 
11, 1987 as a date of signature. 
E. It is disputed whether Carol Klas told the Van Wagoners 
that there were three recent appraisals on the property which 
expressed values ranging from $175,000.00 to $190,000.00. 
F. Carol Klas presented the offer to her former husband 
John Klas, who accepted the same on August 11, 1987. A closing 
date of September 15, 1987 was agreed upon, and the premises were 
vacated in anticipation of the closing. 
G. At no time on or prior to August 11, 1987 did plaintiff 
have any discussions with defendants relative to the subject 
transaction. At no time on or prior to August 11, 1987 was any 
request made by defendants for the production of an appraisal of 
the property. 
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H. It is alleged that on or about August 17, 1987 Mark Van 
Wagoner telephoned Klas and asked for copies of the current 
appraisals on the property so that he could use them to obtain 
financing. It is alleged that Klas responded that he would 
attempt to locate an appraisal. 
I. It is alleged on or about August 24, 1987, Mark Van 
Wagoner again called Klas regarding the appraisals, and Klas 
responded that he still could not locate any of them. It is 
alleged Mr. Van Wagoner told Klas that because Klas could not 
find the appraisals, he had arranged for another appraiser to 
make an appraisal of the property. It is alleged that on or 
about September 10, 1987, Mark Van Wagoner called Klas and 
informed him that the appraiser had valued the property at 
approximately $137,000.00. It is alleged that Mr. Van Wagoner 
again asked for the Klas appraisals. In less than an hour Klas 
brought an appraisal prepared by Devere Kent to Mr. Van Wagoner's 
office. The Kent appraisal was made in 1986, and it had valued 
the property at only $165,000.00. 
J. It is alleged that on or about September 10, 1987, Mr. 
Van Wagoner called Klas and informed him that he had to have the 
other current appraisals which had been the basis of the amount 
of the offer. It is alleged Klas did not come forward with any 
of those appraisals. Instead Klas obtained yet another appraisal 
from Badi Mahmood which showed the market value of the property 
GQQtA 
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to be $160,000.00, and he delivered the appraisal to Mr. Van 
Wagoner. 
K. It is alleged that after he had received the Mahmood 
appraisal for $160,000.00, Klas offered to sell the property to 
the Van Wagoners for $161,000.00. The Van Wagoners 
counteroffered for $153,000.00, but Klas rejected the 
counteroffer. 
L. Klas listed the property with a real estate broker on 
September 29, 1987 at an asking price of $174,500.00. 
M. In a letter to Mr. Klas dated October 2, 1987, the Van 
Wagoners through their counsel gave written notice of the 
withdrawal of their offer to purchase the property given the 
disparity in the represented and actual appraisal values, and 
demanded the return of the earnest money deposit. 
N. In mid-October 1987, defendants were notified that if 
they failed to consummate the sale within ten days, the property 
would be placed on the market in an effort to mitigate damages, 
and that defendants would be responsible for any damages 
sustained. 
0. When defendants failed to consummate the purchase 
agreement on December 15, 1987, Klas returned the earnest money 
payment of $1,000.00 to the Van Wagoners after repeated demands, 
at which time defendants were notified that plaintiff would 
expect them to respond in damages if such should occur. 
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P. On April 13, 1988, Klas sold the property to David B. 
Boyce for $160,000.00. 
II. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
A. Is plaintiff entitled to damages for the difference 
between the sale price of $160,000.00 and the offer of 
$175,000.00? 
B. Is plaintiff entitled to damages for the real estate 
commission in the sum of $11,200.00 which exceeded "finders fee" 
due Carol Klas by $5,950.00, attorney fees and costs? 
C. Are the defendants entitled to damages they suffered 
based on claims for fraud, mutual mistake of fact, and 
detrimental reliance? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A, ARGUMENT OF PLAINTIFF 
1. CONTRACTS ARE CONSTRUED MOST STRICTLY AGAINST THE 
MAKER. 
Plaintiff argues that instruments are construed most 
strongly against the party who drafts the same, and where the 
party drafting the document is an attorney, the significance of 
the authorship becomes much greater. In this case, plaintiffs 
argue that defendants drafted the earnest money sales agreement, 
and thus any ambiguity, if there should be any, should be 
000M3 
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construed most strongly against them, particularly in this 
situation since Mark O. Van Wagoner is an attorney, 
2. THE EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT WAS AN INTEGRATED 
AGREEMENT. 
Plaintiffs contend where an agreement addresses the issues 
and no ambiguity exists, an earnest money sales agreement has 
been recognized as an integrated agreement, and in the absence of 
fraud, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to contradict the 
terms of an integrated agreement. 
3. RELIEF SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO DEFENDANTS UPON GROUNDS 
OF ALLEGED MISTAKE. 
Plaintiff contends the law is well-settled that relief from 
a contract cannot be granted, except on the basis of mutual 
mistake of material fact. In this case they claim the evidence 
shows that no contact existed between the parties prior to the 
signing of the contract, and that defendants had no conversation 
with plaintiff, hence any mistake would have been unilateral in 
nature. 
He further state that for mutual mistake to form a basis for 
relief from a contract, the mistake must be so substantial and 
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties. He contends 
that this is not the case in this situation. 
09Q? VI 
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4. DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF BARGAIN AND EQUITABLE LOSSES MAY BE 
RECOVERED 
Plaintiff contends that one of the measures of damages in 
cases such as this is a loss of a bargain, and that the trial 
court has the latitude to consider such factors as may be 
necessary to achieve justice. Therefore, he claims the Court 
should award $15,000,00 as the difference between what was 
bargained for and what the property was sold for, and in 
addition, the difference in the commission that had to be paid to 
the realtor in the sale of the property and what would have had 
to be paid to Ms, Klas on the original agreement. 
B. ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANTS 
1. THE AGREEMENT IS NOT AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. 
Defendant contends that the agreement is not an enforceable 
contract because it was rescinded by letter dated October 2, 1987 
addressed to the Klas from Van Wagoners1 counsel of record. They 
also contend that Klas was not relying on the agreement at that 
time, since he had listed the property with a real estate broker 
on September 29, 1987. Thus, the agreement was mutually 
abandoned and rescinded by both parties. 
GGOiir; 
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2. THE AGREEMENT IS VOID DUE TO A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF THE 
PARTIES 
The defendants contend that at the time the agreement was 
entered into, the parties mistakenly believed that there were 
current market value appraisals of the property showing it to 
have a market value of at least $175,000.00. The offer made by 
the Van Wagoners v/as based upon the representation of Carol Klas 
that three current appraisals of the property showed values 
ranging from $175,000.00 to $190,000.00. Since there were no 
appraisals at those values, Klas must have been mistaken as to 
their existence. The mutual mistake soon became apparent. The 
actual current appraisals prepared after the date of the 
agreement and prior to the sale of the property in April, 1988 
established that the actual appraised market value was 
substantially below the appraised value both parties mistakenly 
assumed. 
The Van Wagoners and Mr. Klas were both operating under a 
mistake of fact regarding the existence of three current 
appraisals on the property which framed the issue of the market 
value of the property at the time of the agreement. Thus, the 
contract was rendered void. They contend that the contract was 
either voidable, or a basis for rescission of the contract. 
u ^ - *< } 
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3. THE AGREEMENT IS VOIDABLE BECAUSE OF THE 
MISREPRESENTATION REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF CURRENT APPRAISALS. 
The Van Wagoners contend that Carol Klas represented that 
three current appraisals existed valuing the property between 
$175,000.00 and $190,000,00. She also represented that Mr. Klas 
would not entertain an offer less than the appraised value. The 
Van Wagoners contend they relied upon these representations at 
the time they submitted their offer and signed the agreement. 
After Klas accepted the offer and the Van Wagoners requested the 
appraisals to support financing for the property, Klas continued 
to represent that appraisals existed supporting the value of the 
property. Klas knew that the Van Wagoners were relying on the 
representations as to the existence of the appraisals, and had 
based their offer price on those representations. Klas also knew 
or should have known that as of August 1987, the only existing 
appraisal on the property was dated April, 1986, and it showed a 
value substantially less than that purportedly contained in the 
three current appraisals. The Van Wagoners contend that the 
representation as to the existence of the three current 
appraisals and their bearing on the value of the property was the 
most basic element of the agreement, and was a material fact. 
The representation was made knowing that the Van Wagoners would 
rely on it in making an offer and, in fact, the Van Wagoners did 
rely on the representations by making an offer in an amount 
mQt 
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consistent with the purported appraisals, but in fact 
substantially exceeding the actual market value of the property. 
Where a party enters into an agreement in reasonable reliance 
upon a material and fraudulent misrepresentation, the agreement 
thereby created is voidable. 
4. KLAS HAS NOT SUSTAINED ANY DAMAGES. 
The Van Wagoners contend that Klas has not sustained any 
damages. They contend that three appraisals valued the property 
between $175,000.00 and $19 0,000.00. That the Van Wagoners1 
offer was $175,000.00 based on those appraisals. In fact, there 
was an appraisal of April 4, 1986 valuing the property at 
$165,000.00 (Kent appraisals). An independent appraisal arranged 
by the Van Wagoners valued the property at $137,000.00 (Cook 
appraisal) . Mr. Klas subsequently arranged for his own 
appraisal, dated September 18, 1987, valuing the property at 
$160,000.00 (Mahmood appraisal). The property was later sold in 
April, 1988 for $160,000.00. 
The Van Wagoners contend that the measure of damages should 
be determined by the market value of the property at the time of 
the breach, less the contract price to the buyer. Where the 
seller has failed to produce evidence that the property has 
diminished in value, he is not entitled to any damages from a 
defaulting buyer. Klas had subsequently listed the property with 
a broker on September 29, 1987 for $174,500.00. The property 
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subsequently sold in April, 1988 for $160,000.00, an amount the 
Van Wagoners contend is consistent with the market value as 
established by the highest one current appraisal. The market 
value of the property did not diminish after the date of the 
agreement, and Klas sustained no damage. They contend that under 
Klas1 theory of the case, the difference between the agreement 
and the sales price substantially exceeds any damages which he 
may have sustained as a result of the failure of the agreement. 
Thus, an award of the damages as claimed by Klas would result in 
an arbitrary penalty or liquidated damages holding, which would 
be grossly disproportionate to any actual loss sustained by him. 
They further contend that Klas is not entitled to interest, 
because the agreement does not provide for interest, and because 
he received full market value for the property. In addition, 
Klas is not entitled to moving expenses for the reason that he 
would have been responsible for those costs in any event on the 
sale of the property. Furthermore, Klas should not recover his 
attorney's fees for the reasons that they were not necessarily 
incurred, because he received full market value for the property. 
The costs and attorney's fees were incurred by Klas in an effort 
to exact a penalty. 
5. THE VAN WAGONERS1 COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
The Van Wagoners claim that the same facts which give rise 
to the claim for misrepresentation serve as a basis for the Van 
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Wagoners' Counterclaim against Klas. The Counterclaim asserts 
three causes of action for fraud, mutual mistake of fact, and 
detrimental reliance. 
The claim for detrimental reliance is based on the Van 
Wagoners1 reasonable reliance on the misrepresentations regarding 
the appraised value of the property. Following the execution of 
the agreement, the Van Wagoners engaged the services of an 
architect, a contractor, and other workmen. Preliminary services 
were performed by the architect and others for the remodeling of 
the property. This was acknowledged by Carol Klas. 
6. CONCLUSIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
The Van Wagoners conclude that the agreement for the sale of 
the property was rescinded by the Van Wagoners after they 
discovered that the appraisals did not exist as had been 
misrepresented. The facts disclosed reliance on the nonexistent 
appraisals was a mistake shared by both parties, and supports a 
rescission of the agreement. Furthermore, the misrepresentation 
as to the existence of the appraisal renders the agreement 
voidable. 
They contend that even if it is determined that the 
agreement is not voidable or was not rescinded, Klas has not 
sustained any damages, because the property was sold for the 
amount of its appraised value. Klas has not demonstrated that 
,0» Ok *"* A 
\J J Vi* J 
KLAS V. VAN WAGONER PAGE THIRTEEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the property declined in value after the failure of the 
agreement, and has no claim for damages against the Van Wagoners. 
IV, ANALYSIS 
Based on the facts and the evidence as presented at trial, 
the Court is of the opinion that the agreement is not voidable 
and was not rescinded. It is the opinion of the Court that the 
testimony has supported plaintiff's contention that he made no 
representations regarding the existence of any written 
appraisals. The evidence shows that references were made by 
Carol Klas to appraisals, but those references never indicated 
that the appraisals were of a written nature. From the evidence 
it appears that informal oral appraisals were given to Mr. Klas 
by personal friends. Mr. Klas had personal acquaintances Larry 
Payne, Victor Ayers and Howard Badger provide personal appraisals 
on his property, although no written appraisals were ever made, 
oral representations regarding the appraised value based on the 
opinion of these individuals was given to Mr. Klas. It appears 
that Mr. Klas used these opinion appraisals as a basis for his 
current market value of the property. These appraisals range 
from $175,000.00 to $192,000.00. Thus it would appear that any 
representations regarding the appraisals does not appear to be a 
deliberate misrepresentation regarding written appraisals, but it 
does appear that the Van Wagoners misunderstood those 
/•>. ,r> f\ "5 
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representations to be written appraisals. Thus, it does not 
appear that Mr. Klas mistook the appraisals and their values, but 
it may be that the Van Wagoners did misunderstand; therefore, 
there does not appear to be a mutual mistake of fact. If 
anything, there was a unilateral mistake of fact by the Van 
Wagoners. 
Looking at plaintiff's exhibit 13, the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, the purchase price of $175,000.00 does not appear to 
be based on misrepresentation of Mr. Klas. The document was 
prepared by the Van Wagoners. Under the purchase price in 
paragraph 2, there was a provision for outside financing which 
was deleted. This provision would have granted the buyer 
"subject to buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting 
said loan." Unfortunately, this very vital provision was 
stricken out, and approved by both the seller and the buyer. 
Under paragraph 7, special considerations and contingencies, 
there is noted "none." Under paragraph 8, the closing of the 
sale was set for September 15, 1987. Under paragraph 11, the 
agreement to purchase and time limit for acceptance, the buyer 
offers to purchase the property on the above terms and 
conditions. The agreement was signed on August 11, 1987 by both 
Mark O. Van Wagoner and Kathryn Van Wagoner. On the acceptance 
of offer to purchase, it is marked that the seller hereby accepts 
the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above, 
O v 5 vj? J5~ *-* &* 
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and this was dated August 11, 1987, signed by John Klas. Under 
paragraph (1) of the earnest money sales agreement, it states: 
Complete agreement, no oral agreements, this instrument 
constitutes the entire agreement between the parties, 
and supersedes and cancels any and all prior 
negotiations, representations, warranties, 
understandings, or agreements between the parties. 
There are no oral agreements which modify or effect 
this agreement. This agreement cannot be changed 
except by mutual agreement of the parties. 
This integration clause appears to bring together all of the 
understandings and agreements between the parties, and there can 
be no variance, except by mutual agreement of the parties, and in 
case of any breach paragraph (n) provides for attorneys fees and 
costs. 
Based on the above, it would appear to the Court that there 
is a binding agreement between the parties. That there was no 
fraud or misrepresentation, or mutual mistake. The only question 
that remains is the measure of damages. 
In determining the measure of damages, the defendants1 point 
regarding what loss, if any, did the plaintiff sustain is 
important. It appears that based on various types of appraisal, 
the property value can range from anywhere between $137,000.00 to 
$192,000.00. The midpoint appears to be in the $160,000.00 
range. It was testified that there is a margin of error between 
10% to 15%. Thus, based on the various appraisals, the value of 
the property could range below $137,500.00 and above $192,000.00, 
0001.53 
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or anywhere in between. It would not appear that an initial 
listing price of between $175,000.00 and $190,000.00 would be 
unreasonable. Based on Larry A. Payne's testimony, he felt that 
the market was relatively stable at that period of time, and that 
the value of $195,000.00 was not unreasonable. He feels that the 
market has softened since that time, which would be August 3, 
1987. 
Thus, in determining the measure of damages, we must look at 
what the parties bargained for, and what Mr. Klas may have lost 
as a result of the breach of that bargain, tempered by equity and 
fairness to both parties. The Van Wagoners bargained for a piece 
of property in which they were very interested, and which they 
felt $175,000.00 was not an unreasonable price, and were willing 
to make an offer in that amount. They failed to secure 
appraisals that were written which would confirm the actual 
appraised value of the home. It does not appear that Mr. Klas 
intentionally misrepresented that there were written appraisals. 
In his own mind he felt that the opinions given by associates and 
friends of his were sufficient to establish a value for which he, 
himself, would like to sell the home, regardless of any other 
appraisals. 
There does not appear to be clear and convincing evidence of 
any fraudulent misrepresentation. There does appear to be 
evidence that there was a clear misunderstanding of the use of 
0 0 0 1 r*& 
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the term "appraisal11 by Carol Klas and what the Van Wagoners 
thought were appraisals. It does not appear that Mr. Klas 
deliberately misrepresented that there were written appraisals. 
It was incumbent upon the Van Wagoners to request and secure 
those appraisals prior to the time the written earnest money 
agreement was entered into, particularly when that agreement and 
document was prepared and executed by the Van Wagoners. 
It does appear that Mr. Klas attempted to mitigate the 
damages by placing the home on the market when it became apparent 
that the Van Wagoners did not intend to close on the designated 
date. 
There is testimony that Carol Klas moved out of the home 
prior to the time of the closing date in anticipation of the sale 
of the property. If this offer and earnest money agreement were 
not entered into, the question is would she have remained on the 
premises, and also would she have been able to sell the property 
to another buyer at a comparable price, or if not, could some 
negotiations have been entered into, and the property be sold at 
a lesser price, or even a greater price? The Court is of the 
opinion that a fair and equitable award of damages to Mr. Klas 
would be $7,500.00, plus interest and costs, and attorney's fees, 
which should not include the time spent for preparation of jury 
instructions. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that the defendant has breached the earnest 
money sales agreement. That plaintiff is entitled to damages and 
interest, costs and attorney's fees. That the amount of damages 
should be $7,500.00, and no award for real estate commission, 
because it is speculative that Carol Klas could have sold the 
property for that sum of money, and it is the opinion of the 
Court that Mr. Klas would have had to incur the real estate 
commission that was incurred if the property were sold at a 
future date. No award is made for moving costs or any other 
expenses. 
Defendants1 Counterclaim is hereby dismissed. 
Plaintiff's counsel is to prepare Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment pursuant to this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this ,:S o - - day of May, 1989. 
RAYMOND S. UNO ( 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN H. KLAS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK 0. VAN WAGONER and 
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-88-3192 
0 
r 
Subsequent to the Court's rendering of its Memorandum 
Decision on the 30th day of May, 1989, pursuant to the Court's 
direction, plaintiff's counsel prepared Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
Defendants7 counsel filed Objections to Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and For a New Trial supported by 
the required Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and For a New 
Trial. Plaintiff then filed his Response of Plaintiff to 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Motion for New Trial. 
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The defendants next filed Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs7 
Response to the Defendants' Objections to Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Motion For a New Trial. A Request 
to Submit Defendants' Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Motion for New Trial for Decision was 
filed by defendants. Via telephone conference with the 
parties, the Court requested response from plaintiffs' counsel 
regarding unilateral mistake. 
Finally, plaintiff filed Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response 
to Defendants' Objections to Proposed Findings and 
Conclusions. The Court having reviewed all of the pleadings 
and Memoranda, now modifies its Memorandum Decision as follows: 
The Court finds there was a unilateral mistake by the 
defendants based on the facts as presented at trial. That said 
unilateral mistake was substantial and fundamental to warrant a 
rescission of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Defendants 
were unaware of the Kent appraisal and were under the belief 
that the lowest appraisal provided by Carol Klas was the lowest 
appraisal available. In fact, there was a Kent appraisal 
valuing the property at $165,000, the existence of which, if 
known to the defendants, would have made a material difference 
in their offer to buy the subject property. In this finding, 
r-y, r-i* - O ^ 
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the court does not find any fraud or misrepresentation on the 
part of the plaintiff. The Findings of the Court remain, 
except as to the mutual mistake of fact and considerations 
relating to that finding. 
Plaintiffs7 counsel to prepare Findings and Judgment 
incorporating this modification and defendants' prayer for 
relief pursuant to this Supplemental Memorandum Decision. Each 
party to assume their own attorney fees and costs. 
Dated thisQ c day of November, 1989. 
/ 
y_/i. *-/-rf-r^i y^- -
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
<"!> •T""? 00022.^ 
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IN SHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDldlAL DISTRICT 
i M P. I ID FOR S P. I ,T I i A KE COI JNln:. r STATE I P I JT i I I 
JOK: 
vs. 
K L A S , 
I 111 i I I 
MARK 0. VAN' WAGONER and 
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL 1 JO, C-"8-
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial * •.; 
the bcm:u „ the Honorable Raymond S. L 
K ) 1 .. . .. .. argument being m^a^ ,^.^  ouijmin«: .* '. : ,~ 
Court on May 12, 1989. lL\U' p.nintiff was presen4 «*>d 
were present, ^na represented b, > • -junsei, Le^is t-.-vens 
and Craic wider sen. witnesses were -r !v svem -ind 
arguments, *~n^  matter ,:u .*> auLy submitted to t,:ie . ;.: t * r 
decisior -<.rt 1,-ivinrj t a V r - p 4->">P ma.-.+-+-f?r ir-i,-^>- — iv i r** m e n t 
a I id • ,.-.-. - onv, 
pleading^, :A .paiaiions, arguments,, m a crner natters presented 
in the course of said trial, and being thus fully advisea ±u 
»QM -»Jf .L,v •*•«- ^ v - ' - •'•••*'* 
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,..:;.*ses, the Court made arid entered Its Memorandum 
Decision on the 30th day of May, ly'%" . .- 1 • • i the 
"^ r , t ' *• .-. . > . prepared aiiu ^ubmitred Findings of 
: i^t, „ ^ - elusions *.i La.-- i *-j J u J gnu * a ; ^n,r^'' iur 2 
defendants hav J . thorcafner 1 *. .P proposed 
] : ;u . asions ..< .aw, together wit* 1 t . >n 
U Amen^ r innings or 1 ac: I:\CL Con. L^IUO'I? '^ I v,; i~ 
Trial: *•-.*- plai^if^ V r •-? t...:a J- .csponaea to said 
C '--rr jL-j;. ;.i j'ew Tr.a. JJIO the aetendants :: v: ng 
filed -eply * 1 laint.If'a ^°Fnonr;r * -- 1 I 
Objection*-' 1 ' • ^.^iUsiCiis o: Law, 
and li. ;i,, ana f - ; ;aint_:* aereafter 
responded t:. t >. defendants' Rcrlv + o * <->. _ *_ to 
Objections " * . * an.. - MiC^Ubiuns, ana T ne ourt 
having reviewed 5 .. ct ?:..ne pleadings and Mem.ora.nda fi>?d }• 
parties in support * +;; •• - ^ospect 1 v- • • i 
hNWina r • .• ^.pp.oiL^ntai Memoranau:: jecis.cn, 
. . .j^ t;ia i^ l. ^ u> . ','ovember. 1989
 f ana directing ^orrr-: for 
the plaintiff ~r prepare and su- . ict, 
Conciusir ujment -in conformity therewith/ the 
Court noVv ...akes ana enters the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. mhe property which is the subject of this action is a 
parcel of real estate located at 2340 Berkley Street, Salt Lake 
2. /-'" a"!! tl '• s relevant to the issues involved.. the 
plaintiff John n. K1 as was the owner in fee s ' • sa :ii d 
pi t )per I y . 
3 . l a t e . ;u_y . e a r l y A , uu ' - ,*-• s u b j e c t 
r r ^ n o r t v was o f f e r e r ] f o r s a i e n r - s ; . » ^n 
, j r ^ p i , No ,- £,v-_ . j . . S L J i t . Cuu.' ' J I 
S a l e Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e o l i ' t n h . 
4 . 
D i v o r c e , .* l o r m e r v/±i*v oi v:. i c n r x i n , C a r o l r : a s , 
u n d e r t o o k t n r i n a r x e t i n n - - t h e r r o ; > ^ r , T ^^^ *-* -\: *i prrv?erH~ v a s 
K i a s U i a .. ,«L jt-L ^ b p e c i f LC a s k i n g p r i c e f o r t h e p r o p e r t y . 
5 . t " "18G, i 1 a i nv ' • * ^ m i i 1 ! *, ^ n p r ^ i ^ ^ l *' H r , e r e 
'J- J' . t 
a p p r a i s a l ; t iu .vea -i r ,a rRct : v a l u e •* $ 1 6 5 , (h. . •:i+-_ u p a ^ i o n 
L..^ s a l e wo. s a i d ^ n p o r t ' xn i b b / , p j L a ± n t n i i iau p e r s o n a l 
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acquaintances, engaged in real estate practice, provide opii iion 
appraisals oi i the current value of the property v;hich v/ere :)ral 
trie market value for sale of che property. -^  n *;.,: 
appra i sa 1 ? ra nged f r on $ 2 ~i - ••">00 t.o > ic* -• n n •' 
6. tt- -
inspected "ne property M tt presence L, I ..ii'Oi Klas ai id 
expressed ~tr. interest, ir. "••• :ri:-r^ " i- v ronorty. 
7. ... course r utienadn:- _: - ,. c Jii::: :: ] 3 , 
prior -Vagust . . ; ) :' . references were made t ,, +"he effect 
T,-,>. .* _ -, * . •.-" h • - rang' JL 
J, UK .,* i *-, * -.. .. - j G i o n u a n t i i i J ca . : t - . ( . . +*o K - . ^ 
v/r • r . t e n n n t u f - ' h o v / e v e r , t h e r e i s . . s r - r . / h e t h e r p l a i n t i f f 
8 . . , or dbo i r . Au^u: »' ' n o d e f e n d a n t _;> •. T7^n 
W a g o n e r •'• * lc -\i: a t t o r n e y p r e p a r e d aim d e l i v e r e d HI E a r n e s t 
. —« -. ,- o^,r, < . . * 
b e a r i n g ' -y d a l e o : Augus*. : . ^ -o ^ u : e f i j / t j >^: ^ ig r id t ^ i e 
by the parti es agreemen; '< b a s e d u p o n a n y 
in i si: epr e s e i I l::a !::i « 
9. Carol Kias presented tne o n e r : J ner former husband, 
j 0 h n H . Klas, who accepted the same on August .JLJ., 1^87, and a 
' O •-•'• *••••' ***< v 
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closing date of September 15, !lj|j' " \ .JIIL. . njieud upon I iy Llie 
oarties and the: oreniises were vacated * intic ipat i ;>r: :>: *-*>• 
was the lowest price upin.un ut,piaisu,j ^. , ti..i. , y 
Carol Klas. 
in. - . * - - -.y 
Sales Agreement on ,-^ ujus" . . ivo/ 
m e 'toqrated clause contained - m e Earnest M ~-ney 
Su.es Agreemen . , 
the understandings and agreements ot the parties and mei-- d^ii 
nutudl agreement or *"he —
 r ^ > -
^ . - :.o . . . . . ^ p r io r to Auguj 
p ^ h i t i f f engage ir vn\ discussion .-. i4~h tl^ io defendai * r e l a : LYG 
- « " .u Linn : ~,: ' L~±OL L-. \U just 
.^87 was any request made b\ ne de::onua::l to r> 
for the nroducrinn ippraisal c : rd,e property, except, 
. • . •• ' "dants oa^t : itred 
i: i : * -a L- 11 y -/J t i i C i i - K i a s i:< i a s k e u h-. . *^tdin ^n » *P^L a *~«-
and :"" r e q u e s t e d t h e s i m e from p l a i n t i f t . 
i/ : l a :::« 4 ei 
offer was uacle to !:;:<c '.icfcndaiits ' . Jowloy, .iter 
WHICH tne isfcndantF: f-nl^d mppt thn closino dat< 
September "-
they did 1 . ten: f> consummate the purchase or tne property. 
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T1 1 E i ] c :ii i t:ii ff 1:1 I = it :i J isted 11 Ie property with a real 
estate croxer - e~ September 29, 1987, at an asking 
price of $174,500. 
"n nr about October ° inoi +-u~ defendants through 
their counsel gave formal written not" ice f e t-n^ MJ , i-.• - f 
t h e w: t';drnv ^ ' ;.. ; 
demanaou LUG n.:., . - - arnc-si MO,I^ deposit : earnest 
money deposit v; : • thereafter refunded and returned iu ine 
d r.-" 3 •- s. 
JO, approximate] v viid-October, 1987, lai:*:t ". !* gave 
defendants norir-. - K ^  ^hc" failed 1 ^ ~ n •• I he 
a .. L..C property with,., t. ,. *<-»ys, 
the property v,ouh: he placed on r e market i -; 3l:fom to 
mitigate damages * -w i t h at d e f e n d a n t s w o i i ] d b e r e s p o i i s :i b II e f : • :i : 
a _ 4ci . L< i : . V U 1 ^ .1 
• .. iefendants failed consummate the purchase of 
the oroperty and on Decrr :••• the pi in,1 i 
t:. _ earnest money deposn :,i ,>- ,0Uti, it which time the 
defendants were f u r t her notified b;; ) p 1 a I n t i f f t h a t u ^ • ^  J 
l o o k t o sa i d d e f e n d a n t s ' • • r d a m a g e s i f sI i : 1 i s 1 :ic i 11! < 
*! H „ 'The property v • • . ,icod for. sa J e J i i th< > j.: • : .n nui met 
foi period of several months during which period of time a 
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t . t._ .-ient effort was made to locate ~ buy - - > 
otherwise sell the property at its fair market va^ie, ~ .^  
At r •' ' ' - . . - w --
at a . c e ^Ltu/O'- w:: ,-. >•;.:.' t:\or the highest and best1 
price available . nn market plac'1 
, ;t.. .:. ? apprajt s . and 
were u/ide: the belief that the lowest appraisal referred t^ • \, 
Carol Kl 'S va--~ + r^ * love1-'* appraisal on tnc troi 
11
 *.:. ; _: _:-dants, wn iu, >Tc .\.«. 
material lifferencr in t'y,: oiler to buy "he subject property. 
- ,, - -:r>- r-' *-' - oiaintiti ht ~ <- • 
.:j:'3iii.:.ts were rei/i J j ; ., n. n.eyed 
representations male by Car.i KLar ;td * * ^imc d> * -
nla: rV f: - ' --:;•• - -
 :-.- > * • -
vaiuc c£ '-we prcpCLtj oth-.r than by Siqninq and accepting the 
Earnest »,*
 t Sales Agreement submitted r-y the defendants, 
dated Ant- . " 1 9 8 7 - .'--- •!••••• : .. j ,; . :te i 
plaintil. w.r^a.jh Carol Kias pursuant to paragraph 4 above and 
pursuant - plaintiff and Carol Kl a d<~-^star/n iv ^  -•-> ^je 
.,iu defendants ,t i ::.jt re. uu w4/ representations 
made by the pla^r.Lii'i pertaining ^ the lair market value of 
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the subject property prior to the execution and signina -^F +->^  
Earnest Money Agreement:, dated August , 198* handle: : . 
plai i i biff's
 A . .:JL-S I . v , €•>:"• • ' 
representations made by ::.i:^:\ Kins. \-:d the lirst contact .•
 tcti 
occurred between t!vi plaiptif-f and +_h< defendants was *" • 
execution of - ..in*.-* .: •
 : ->u . -L ^'j,ue—• .,: 
August i 98 7. 
*"! ' -" the defendants had opportunity ^^ investigate 
the issue of fair market value < dip nrc; _: : , 
execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of Augu:" 
'
 ,:
*"' . * existence oi "r::r?. "sals 
en. iepcet "ni;c-u L, . ^ : .. . IMUO reg^ia^ig :;ie market va . .,L .-. the 
property, 
23, 
approve oi an; -jnd:.tions; exceptions11 i^ i:n^  Lduiest 
Money Sa^s Agreement at the tiuse uf its execution an i del . JRTV 
to the nl .-;,.- - ,-. . .< , 
purchase the property, tne purchase .:',-ir.i have CJ i>e e\ •,< 
basis tha+- there wen- *v •- ront ipaencies, exceptions i 
1:1: le i : • • - * ; ^ ' 
Sa ies Agreement• 
24
 # rpj-ie Earnest Money Sales Agreement and offer 
purchase the subject property at a price 
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the various "appraisals" ranging from, $l?'7 ^oo 4-r <—*** -^r ^--
the fair market value '-.f r'ne property in question at the time 
i . ...: s . 
25. At: no : I :P.O ,;i d * ::<- parties agree t -,M; "escissici 
^hr- 'onrrnct, altn^uqh defendant: Mar* van W^~^^r ~r-<- * •! d 
. . ev. . i\ , ; ui:e 
defendants d±u v' accept the $161,-0C ;ffer !'ro:r, plaint ;f.'f, 
the deal wouia be oil. 
26. At nn time •. • the
 L .^..Lif make any 
misrepresentations to defendants regard: n-; ar./ appraisal J >-
i . • * • .- t 
Liie plaintiff v/.:t:i reference ' J u.ie ;.a* .ir> hij extent •..: J" v 
appraisals; hov;ovo: , there .vas a m : sundGrstind i nq between (' irol 
K i ' * f -" * u ' • ' * -J ' r*- f -' "appraisal. tf Tl le 
defendants understood . t r . ::.uan written. 
27. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement of August, 1087, had 
: i::i : ken 
CiUiR tne agreement and approved i ^ parties thereto, and 
similcirly, said agreement ^a , r, r a *- i <- n *— * special 
CCI ' . ; . - : . . . - * _ ^  <_ U 
agreement. 
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28. The plaintiff did not make any fraudulent 
representations or misrepresentations relative to the terms and 
provisions of the sale and purchase of the property. The 
defendants, however, were negotiating on the understanding 
there were appraisals and the appraisals were in writing. 
29. The market pertaining to the value of the property in 
question diminished or softened between the date of the 
contract of August, 1987, and the sale of the property by the 
plaintiff in April, 1988. 
30. In the course of negotiations between the defendants 
and Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing 
the property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown to 
defendants, and if known, would have made a material difference 
in their offer to buy the subject property. This was a 
unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which was 
fundamental and substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal was 
never provided by Carol Klas in spite of defendants' request 
for copies of appraisals. In this regard, the Court does not 
find any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the 
plaintiff. 
31. The defendants considered the price of $175,000 as 
being a reasonable price for the property in question at the 
time the offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them, 
O ^ M O ^ ^ O 
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5. The plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. 
6. The Earnest Money Agreement is rescinded and is void 
and of no force or effect. 
1. The defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed. 
8. Each party is to bear his own attorney's fees, costs 
and expenses of litigation. 
Dated this/ —> day of March, 1990, 
rJ r, C / 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
"U'UXiiti.., * •»•„/ 
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based on representations made by Carol Klas and without the 
benefit of the Devere Kent appraisal. 
32* The defendants made no attempt to secure appraisals on 
the subject property prior to the time the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement was entered into by the parties, because of 
representations made by Carol Klas, there were "appraisals" in 
existence. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their understanding 
that the lowest existing appraisal on the property was $175,000. 
2. Their mistake was caused by their misunderstanding of 
the representations made by Carol Klas, and failure to have the 
Devere Kent appraisal provided in a timely manner. 
3. The mistake was substantial and fundamental to the 
proposed agreement between the defendants and plaintiff. If 
the Van Wagoners had been aware of the undisclosed, lower 
appraisal, it would have made a material difference in their 
offer to buy the property. 
4. The mistake provides a basis for rescission of the 
Earnest Money Agreement. 
jf>rn?r'^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to 
SL-'' 
the following, this I U day of March, 1990: 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Craig W. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 S. State, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M M 
K. I 
m 
MAR 1 3 1990 
\ B y - ^ u > r-xi^^. 
>.-, Deputy C»erk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN H. KLAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK O. VAN WAGONER and 
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. C-88-3192 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to 
the bench, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding on May 9 and 
10, 1989, with final argument being made and submitted to the 
Court on May 12, 1989. The plaintiff was present and 
represented by his counsel, Brant H. Wall, and the defendants 
were present and represented by their counsel, Lewis D. Stevens 
and Craig W. Anderson. Witnesses were duly sworn and 
testified, evidence introduced, and upon submission of final 
arguments, the matter was duly submitted to the Court for 
decision. The Court having taken the matter under advisement 
and having duly considered all of the evidence, testimony, 
pleadings, stipulations, arguments, and other matters presented 
in the course of said trial, and being thus fully advised in 
lKV yKJ- -l*J' V * ' A-..-i "* 
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the premises, the Court made and entered its Memorandum 
Decision on the 30th day of May, 1989, and counsel for the 
plaintiff having thereafter prepared and submitted Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and counsel for the 
defendants having thereafter filed Objections to the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together with a Motion 
to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions oi Law, and for a New 
Trial; the plaintiff having thereafter responded to said 
Objections and Motion for New Trial, and the defendants having 
filed a reply to plaintiff's response to the defendants' 
Objections to proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Motion for New Trial, and the plaintiff thereafter 
responded to the defendants' Reply to plaintiff's Response to 
Objections to proposed Findings and Conclusions, and the Court 
having reviewed all of the pleadings and Memoranda filed by the 
parties in support of their respective positions, and the Court 
having made and entered its Supplemental Memorandum Decision, 
dated the 4th day of November, 1989, and directing counsel for 
the plaintiff to prepare and submit Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in conformity therewith, and 
being thus fully advised in the premises, and having entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE, as follows: 
1. A unilateral mistake of material fact exists on the 
part of the defendants which allows the defendants to rescind 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of August 1987. 
2. The plaintiff did not commit any fraud or 
misrepresentation in any of the negotiations with the 
defendants herein and did not breach the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement of August, 1987. 
3. By virtue of the unilateral mistake on the part of the 
defendants, the damages sustained by plaintiff are not 
recoverable. 
4. The Complaint of the plaintiff and the Counterclaim of 
the defendants are dismissed, no cause for action, and each of 
the parties are to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
Dated thisA^ day of March, 1990. 
RAYMOND S. UNO ( 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
{ \ J \j> ^ ?•<!• « •• '•• 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Judgment, to the following, this / <7 day 
of March, 1990: 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Craig W. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 S. State, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 8ISTB10T 80tf»T 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 3 1 1990 
SAW LAKE CdUWWr; 
By. 
T 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I'Jwpuiy Clerk 
JOHN H. KLAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK 0. VAN WAGONER and 
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. C-88-3192 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to 
the bench, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding on May 9 and 
10, 1989, with final argument being made and submitted to the 
Court on May 12, 1989. The plaintiff was present and 
represented by his counsel, Brant H. Wall, and the defendants 
were present and represented by their counsel, Lewis D. Stevens 
and Craig W. Anderson. Witnesses were duly sworn and 
testified, evidence introduced, and upon submission of final 
arguments, the matter was duly submitted to the Court for 
decision. The Court having taken the matter under advisement 
and having duly considered all of the evidence, testimony, 
pleadings, stipulations, arguments, and other matters presented 
in the course of said trial, and being thus fully advised in 
•f 
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the premises, the Court made and entered its Memorandum 
Decision on the 30th day of May, 1989, and counsel for the 
plaintiff having thereafter prepared and submitted Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and counsel for the 
defendants having thereafter filed Objections to the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together with a Motion 
to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for a New 
Trial; the plaintiff having thereafter responded to said 
Objections and Motion for New Trial, and the defendants having 
filed a reply to plaintiff's response to the defendant's 
Objections to proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lav/, 
and Motion for New Trial, and the plaintiff thereafter 
responded to the defendants' Reply to plaintiff's Response to 
Objections to proposed Findings and Conclusions, and the Court 
having reviewed all of the pleadings and Memoranda filed by the 
parties in support of their respective positions, and the Court 
having made and entered its Supplemental Memorandum Decision, 
dated the 4th day of November, 1989, and directing counsel for 
the plaintiff to prepare and submit Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in conformity therewith, and 
the Court thereafter having amended paragraph 13 of the 
Findings of Fact, which does not alter the Conclusions of Law 
or Judgment, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
000237 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The property which is the subject of this action is a 
parcel of real estate located at 2340 Berkley Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 
2. At all times relevant to the issues involved, the 
plaintiff John H. Klas was the owner in fee simple of said 
property. 
3. In late July or early August, 1987, the subject 
property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a Decree 
of Divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree of 
Divorce, the former wife of the plaintiff, Carol Klas, 
undertook the marketing of the property and said property was 
not listed with a real estate broker. The plaintiff John H. 
Klas did not set a specific asking price for the property. 
5. In 1986, plaintiff acquired an appraisal by Devere 
Kent (the Kent appraisal) for mortgage loan purposes. That 
appraisal showed a market value of $165,000. In anticipation 
of the sale of said property in 1987, plaintiff had personal 
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acquaintances, engaged in real estate practice, provide opinion 
appraisals on the current value of the property which were oral 
in nature, and used by plaintiff as a basis for establishing 
the market value for sale of the property. Said opinion 
appraisals ranged from $175,000 to $192,000. 
6t In late July or early August, 1987, the defendants 
inspected the property in the presence of Carol Klas and 
expressed an interest in acquiring the property. 
7 4 In the course of defendants' contact with Carol Klas, 
prior to August 11, 1987, references were made to the effect 
that she understood "appraisals" had been made in the range of 
$175,000 to $192,000, which defendants believed to be of a 
written nature, however, there is a dispute whether plaintiff 
or Carol Klas represented that "written" appraisals existed. 
8^  On or about August 7, 1987, the defendant Mark Van 
Wagoner, who is an attorney, prepared and delivered an Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement to Carol Klas, dated August 7, 1987, and 
bearing the date of August 11, 1987, as the date of signature 
by the parties. Said agreement was not based upon any 
misrepresentation by plaintiff or Carol Klas. 
9 .| Carol Klas presented the offer to her former husband, 
John H. Klas, who accepted the same on August 11, 1987, and a 
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closing date of September 15, 1987 was agreed upon by the 
parties and the premises were vacated in anticipation of the 
closing. The sales price for the premises was $175,000, which 
was the lowest price of the opinion appraisals provided by 
Carol Klas. 
10. Plaintiff and defendants executed the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement on August 11, 1987. 
11. The integrated clause contained in the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement, dated August 7, 1987, brings together all of 
the understandings and agreements of the parties and there can 
be no variance except by mutual agreement of the parties. 
12. At no time on or prior to August 11, 1987, did the 
plaintiff engage in any discussion with the defendants relative 
to the subject transaction and at no time on or prior to August 
11, 1987 was any request made by the defendants to plaintiff 
for the production of an appraisal of the property, except, 
however, pursuant to paragraph 4 above, defendants negotiated 
directly with Carol Klas and asked her to obtain an "appraisal" 
and she requested the same from plaintiff. 
13. A series of negotiations intervened, and what was 
understood by the defendants as a counter offer was made to the 
defendants through Mr. Cowley, after which the defendants 
failed to meet the closing date of September 15, 1987, and 
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defendants notified the plaintiff that they did not intend to 
consummate the purchase of the property. 
14. The plaintiff then listed the property with a real 
estate broker on or about September 29, 1987, at an asking 
price of $174,500. 
15. On or about October 2, 1987, the defendants through 
their counsel gave formal written notice to the plaintiff of 
the withdrawal of their offer to purchase the property and 
demanded the return of the earnest money deposit, which earnest 
money deposit was thereafter refunded and returned to the 
defendants. 
16. In approximately mid-October, 1987, plaintiff gave 
defendants notice that if they failed to consummate the 
acquisition and purchase of the property within ten (10) clays, 
the property would be placed on the market in an effort to 
mitigate damages and that defendants would be responsible for 
any damages sustained. 
17. The defendants failed to consummate the purchase of 
the property and on December 15, 1987, the plaintiff returned 
the earnest money deposit of $1,000, at which time the 
defendants were further notified by plaintiff that he would 
look to said defendants for any damages, if such should occur. 
18. The property was placed for sale in the open market 
for a period of several months during which period of time a 
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bona fide and diligent effort was made to locate a buyer or 
otherwise sell the property at its fair market value, and on 
April 13, 1988, said property was sold to one David B. Boyce, 
at a price of $160,000, which was then the highest and best 
price available in the market place. 
19. Defendants were unaware of the "Kent11 appraisal and 
were under the belief that the lowest appraisal referred to by 
Carol Klas was the lowest appraisal on the property. The 
"Kent" appraisal, if known to the defendants, would have made a 
material difference in their offer to buy the subject property. 
20. At no time did the plaintiff have any knowledge or 
notice that the defendants were relying on any alleged 
representations made by Carol Klas and at no time did the 
plaintiff make any representation relative to the fair market 
value of the property other than by signing and accepting the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement submitted by the defendants, 
dated August 11, 1987. However, defendants negotiated with 
plaintiff through Carol Klas pursuant to paragraph 4 above and 
pursuant to plaintiff and Carol Klas7 understanding the range 
would be the property value of the three highest "appraisals." 
21. The defendants did not rely upon any representations 
made by the plaintiff pertaining to the fair market value of 
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the subject property prior to the execution and signing of the 
Earnest Money Agreement, dated August 11, 1987, handled by 
plaintiff's attorney, James P. Cowley, except for 
representations made by Carol Klas, and the first contact which 
occurred between the plaintiff and the defendants was on the 
execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement which was on 
August 17, 1987. 
22. Although the defendants had opportunity to investigate 
the issue of fair market value of the property prior to 
execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of August 7, 
1987, they continued to rely upon the existence of appraisals 
as represented by Carol Klas regarding the market value of the 
property. 
23. The defendants knew that the plaintiff would not 
approve of any "conditions11 or "exceptions11 to the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement at the time of its execution and delivery 
to the plaintiff and were advised that if they desired to 
purchase the property, the purchase would have to be on the 
basis that there were no contingencies, exceptions, or 
conditions of sale other than as set forth in the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement. 
24. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement and offer to 
purchase the subject property at a price of $175,000 was among 
000303 
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the various "appraisals" ranging from $137,000 to $190,000 for 
the fair market value of the property in question at the time 
of the sale to the defendants. 
25. At no time did the parties agree to any rescission of 
the contract, although defendant Mark O. Van Wagoner was told 
by plaintiff's attorney, James P. Cowley, that if the 
defendants did not accept the $161,000 offer from plaintiff, 
the deal would be off. 
26. At no time did the plaintiff make any 
misrepresentations to defendants regarding any appraisal made 
on the property and no misunderstanding existed on the part of 
the plaintiff with reference to the nature and extent of any 
appraisals; however, there was a misunderstanding between Carol 
Klas and defendants regarding the term "appraisal." The 
defendants understood it to mean written. 
27. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement of August, 1987, had 
the provision relating to the procurement of financing stricken 
from the agreement and approved by all parties thereto, and 
similarly, said agreement had a notation that no special 
considerations or contingencies existed relative to the written 
cigreement. 
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28. The plaintiff did not make any fraudulent 
representations or misrepresentations relative to the terms and 
provisions of the sale and purchase of the property. The 
defendants, however, were negotiating on the understanding 
there were appraisals and the appraisals were in writing. 
29. The market pertaining to the value of the property in 
question diminished or softened between the date of the 
contract of August, 1987, and the sale of the property by the 
plaintiff in April, 1988. 
30. In the course of negotiations between the defendants 
and Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing 
the property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown to 
defendants, and if known, would have made a material difference 
in their offer to buy the subject property. This was a 
unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which was 
fundamental and substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal was 
never provided by Carol Klas in spite of defendants7 request 
for copies of appraisals. In this regard, the Court does not 
find any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the 
plaintiff. 
31. The defendants considered the price of $175,000 as 
being a reasonable price for the property in question at the 
time the offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them, 
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based on representations made by Carol Klas and without the 
benefit of the Devere Kent appraisal. 
32. The defendants made no attempt to secure appraisals on 
the subject property prior to the time the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement was entered into by the parties, because of 
representations made by Carol Klas, there were "appraisals" in 
existence. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their understanding 
that the lowest existing appraisal on the property was $175,000. 
2. Their mistake was caused by their misunderstanding of 
the representations made by Carol Klas, and failure to have the 
Devere Kent appraisal provided in a timely manner. 
3. The mistake was substantial and fundamental to the 
proposed agreement between the defendants and plaintiff. If 
the Van Wagoners had been aware of the undisclosed, lower 
appraisal, it would have made a material difference in their 
oiler to buy the property. 
4. The mistake provides a basis for rescission of the 
Earnest Money Agreement. 
QQO* 
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5. The plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. 
6. The Earnest Money Agreement is rescinded and is void 
and of no force or effect. 
7. The defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed. 
8. Each party is to bear his own attorney's fees, costs 
and expenses of litigation. 
• * ~r 
Dated thisry/ ^  day of May, 1990. 
/si ** 1 - •—«. ** s ^^*»u. / v* 
(//...J '• r*'? v---*<-..- ^ 
RAYMOND S. UNO ' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, to the following, this Q\ day of May, 1990: 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lew7is T. Stevens 
Craig W. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 s. State, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Wci^fm^ l^t^^ 
WALL & WALL (APC) 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 800 BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UT &41U 
(801) S2t 8220 
[BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3364 
WALL & WALL, a . p . c . 
'Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f 
S u i t e 800 Bos ton B u i l d i n g 
(Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
[Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
[JOHN H. KLAS, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
klARK O. VAN WAGONER a n d 
JKATHRYN VAN WAGONER, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-3192 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
) 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial to 
[the bench, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding, on May 9 and 
10, 1989, with final arguments being made and submitted to the 
Court on May 12, 1989. The Plaintiff was present and represented 
i 
|by his counsel, Brant H. Wall, and the Defendants were present and 
Represented by their counsel, Lewis D. Stevens and Craig W. 
(Anderson. Witnesses were duly sworn and testified, evidence 
introduced, and upon submission of final arguments, the matter was 
[duly submitted to the Court for decision. The Court having taken 
the matter under advisement and having duly considered all of the 
[evidence, testimony, pleadings, stipulations, arguments, and other 
matters presented in the course of said trial, and being thus fully 
advised in the premises, the Court made and entered its Memorandum 
-<£" 
WALL & WALL (A P C ) 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 800 BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8-4111 
(801) 521 8220 
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pecision the 30th day of May7 1989, and counsel for the Plaintiff 
having thereafter prepared and submitted Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and counsel for the Defendants 
having thereafter filed Objections to the proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, together with a Motion to Amend Findings 
pf Fact and Conclusions of Law and for a New Trial; the Plaintiff 
paving thereafter responded to said Objections and Motion for New 
Trial and the Defendants having filed a reply to Plaintiff's 
response to the Defendants1 Objections to proposed Findings of 
uFact, Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial, and the 
plaintiff thereafter responded to the Defendants1 reply to 
(Plaintiff's response to Objections to proposed Findings and 
Conclusions, and the Court having reviewed all of the pleadings and 
memoranda filed by the parties in support of their respective 
positions, and the Court having made and entered its Supplemental 
Memorandum Decision dated the 4th day of November, 1989, and 
directing counsel for the Plaintiff to prepare and submit Findings 
pf Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in conformity therewith; 
Plaintiff's counsel having thereafter prepared and submitted 
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and 
Defendants' counsel having also submitted proposed Findings of Fact 
[and Conclusions of Law and Plaintiff's counsel having thereafter 
jfiled an Objection to Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact and! 
[Conclusions of Law, and Defendants' counsel having thereafter filed 
!an Objection to Plaintiff's proposed Amended Findings of Fact and] 
Conclusions of Law; the Court thereafter having prepared and 
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pntered its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
pn March 13, 1990, Plaintiff's counsel filed an Objection to the 
Courts Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, together 
with a Motion to Amend same, and Defendants' counsel having filed a 
response to Plaintiff's Objection to and Motion to Amend the 
Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and the 
Court having duly considered the position of the parties in their 
respective objections and responses thereto, prepared and entered 
pn the 31st day of May, 1990, its own Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and having done so and thus being fully advised 
lin the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their understanding 
[that the lowest existing appraisal on the property was $175,000. 
2. Their mistake was caused by their misunderstanding of 
|the representations made by Carol Klas, and failure to have the 
JDevere Kent appraisal provided in a timely manner. 
3. The mistake was substantial and fundamental to the 
jproposed agreement between the Defendants and Plaintiff. If the 
k/an Wagoners had been aware of the undisclosed, lower appraisal, it 
would have made a material difference in their offer to buy the 
property. 
4. The mistake provides a basis for rescission of the 
[Earnest Money Agreement. 
5. The Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. 
WALL & WALL (APCl 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 800 BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 m 
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6. The Earnest Money Agreement is rescinded and is void 
land of no force or effect. 
7. The Defendants1 Counterclaim is dismissed. 
8. Each party is to bear his own attorney's fees, costs, 
jand expenses of litigation. 
DATED thisC5A;/) day of&viSQty 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
z , LA^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
[foregoing Amended Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to Lewis D. 
[Stevens and Craig W. Anderson, Attorneys for Defendants, 215 South 
State, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this M day of 
jJune, 1990. 
eizretary to Brant H. Wall 
a uwo^^ 
BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3364 
WALL & WALL, a.p.C.3104) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
? NOV.2 9 1989 
^ ;••. 4 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN H. KLAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK O. and KATHRYN 
VAN WAGONER, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. C 88-3192 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
COME NOW the parties to the above entitled action, by 
and through their respective counsel of record, and stipulate 
and agree as follows: 
Should the trial court's award of attorney's fees be 
sustained or otherwise upheld on appeal, that the sum of 
$6,000 is a fair and reasonable amount to be awarded to the 
Plaintiff as attorney's fees necessarily incurred in the above 
entitled action through the trial of said cause, and that in 
addition thereto, the additional sum of $250 should be awarded 
as attorney's fees for the preparation of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in this matter, for a total 
of $6,250 and that such sum may be entered in the Judgment of 
the Court. 
"r 
WALL * WALL (A P C ) 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 800 BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84111 
(801)5218220 
DATED this 
-2-
day of August, 1989. 
JLU , f -• / 
BR f^clT H." WALL1' 
^At to rney f o r P l a i n t i f f 
AIcTA -4^-c CR G/W. ANDERSON 
^Attorney for Defendant 
